

Populism and Political Identity in a Crossed Road: The Crisis of Representation and Electoral Pressure

Muhammad Habibi^{✉1} 

Correspondence:

1. Pusat Penelitian dan Pengembangan Pendidikan dan Pelatihan, Badan Pengawas Pemilihan Umum, **Indonesia**

✉ muhammad.habibi@bawaslu.go.id

Article's History:

Received: August 10, 2022

Accepted: August 20, 2022

Published: August 22, 2022

Citation:

Akbar,

Abstract

This paper discusses how identity is manifested as a tool in the struggle for hegemony that takes place in the electoral democracy contestation. The approach used in this research is the study of literature used primarily to explain the relationship between the two entities and map the conceptualization of populism as identity politics. Research findings show a meeting of populism and identity politics succeeded in making identity politics a manifestation of a symbol of resistance to the regime maintained by the political elite and the oligarchy. In this paper, an analysis framework is also offered by trying to explore the links between populism and identity politics, summarizing a number of factors, such as globalization, market economics, and the dysfunction of liberal democracy that raises the vulnerability and marginalization of affected individuals and then turns around and uses identity as a mechanism to maintain its existence.

Keywords: populism; political identity; electoral pressure; election



Introduction

The DKI Jakarta Governor Election in 2017 became the political event that most attracted the public's attention, especially because the SARA issue was so intense that it colored the battle between the two pairs of candidates who entered the second round. Starting from the blasphemy case which was blamed on Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (or popularly known as Ahok), incumbent Governor of DKI Jakarta, which was then followed by a series of demonstrations in the name of defending certain religious actions. The issue of blasphemy even goes beyond other issues that are more related to the management of public affairs, such as reclamation, urban planning, and handling other social problems in Jakarta.

The strengthening of religion-based identity politics in the election of the Governor of DKI Jakarta is an interesting phenomenon because it appears in the shadow of the rise of populism. In a global context, the rise of populism also occurred in various parts of the world. The character of the Trump administration in the United States that wants to revive US supremacy and the continuation of Brexit political sentiment will foster a growing sentiment of identity. A similar trend has also strengthened in Asia, along with the victory of populist politicians in elections in India and the Philippines.

In Indonesia, the strengthening of support for conservative Islamic groups, as seen in the Jakarta Election, is an indication of the strengthening of populism. These various trends show that the rise of populism cannot be separated from the politicization of identity. Identity politics at the beginning of its development is examined as a form of expression of the struggle of minority groups to gain recognition of its existence (Habibi, 2017). This is illustrated by the many political movements in identity that emerged as a form of struggle by ethnic, religious, gender or other interest groups that had been marginalized by majority policies or other policies of the dominant group. Identity politics that emerged as an embodiment of populism, on the contrary, became the political strategy of the majority group to maintain its existence.

The reappearance of populism in the last two decades in various parts of the world has attracted the interest of several social scientists to explain the nature, character, and model of populist regimes. The 1960s populist regimes in Latin America, Europe, and Asia, including Indonesia, differ from the variants of populism that are developing today. The presence of contemporary populism tends to coincide with the strengthening of religious or tribal identity sentiments. The context of global capitalism has given rise to forms of competition in which the majority group has become a marginalized group so that populism or populist political practices have emerged to fight for majority groups when faced with global pressures (Hadiz, 2016; Inglehart & Norris, 2017).

As Inglehart & Norris (2017) said, populism arises because of two conditions, namely first, because of economic inequality and secondly, because of conflicting cultural values. In the context of economic politics, populists are considered as part of the old forces who want to fight the domination of the new elite. The new elite wants to push the agenda of modern capitalism which has implications for the marginalization of the old elites who have so far benefited from the mode of rent accumulation. While the clash of cultural values triggers populism when the inclusion of a new identity and culture attacks the existence of old values held by the majority of citizens, which then triggers a reactionary backlash. These majority citizens feel that they must reclaim ownership of existing community values through a rejection of a new identity.

In this populist political context, the narrative about identity is shifting. Identity politics is no longer a strategy of minority groups to fight for their existence, but rather what emerges is the struggle of the majority groups to face global interests that continue to urge them at home. Populism voiced the marginalization of the majority in the economic competition and global culture. The rise of populism also triggered academic debate, concerning the positive or negative effects it brought on democracy. The counter-group views populism as a pathological condition of the development of liberal democracy. This is caused by the unpreparedness of the democratic system for changes in cultural relations due to globalization, while power relations are still dominated by old forces that are still in the circle of power. Marginalization due to a combination of the dominance of neoliberal economic management (capitalism) accompanied by the depoliticization of liberal democracy through the shortening of political space to the extent of formal politics, is then exploited by political elites who are fighting by using populist rhetoric to gain support in the existing democratic space. Therefore, there is nothing natural about the identity or culture of a society. Identity is a construction of power created to fight for the existence of an entity in political space.

For some researchers, the formulation of populism with identity politics is indeed worrying because it is considered to create an illiberal democracy situation (Bourchier, 2015). Populism and identity politics, identity populism are two mutually supporting entities; both present as global phenomena. Therefore, the compound between populism and identity politics requires careful study and explanation.

This paper seeks to explore an analytical framework that explains the relationship between the two entities and maps the conceptualization of populism as identity politics. The first part discusses the definition and concept of populism from a variety of conceptual perspectives, contexts, and the constellations of their emergence in several parts of the world and empirical practices at least in the last decade. The second part discusses the strengthening of identity politics. The central argument of

this article is to explain the factors of globalization and the market economy as well as the dysfunction of liberal democracy that gives rise to vulnerability and marginalization, where the affected individual turns around and uses identity as a mechanism to maintain existence. The third part elaborates on the analytical framework to explain the striking of identity politics with populism. What factors link some social scientists to call it the demand and supply side between populism and identity politics? The last section is aimed at projecting the impact of populism and identity politics on democratization.

Research Method

The approach used in this research is the study of literature used primarily to explain the interrelationships between the two entities and map the conceptualization of populism as identity politics, documents selected using applications from the publish or perish database. This method is carried out using discourse mapping techniques, developed by Sosale (2007), specifically to provide a framework, method, and analysis model. According to him, sources for mapping discourse can come from a series of texts, in the form of policy files, scientific publications, reports, and official documents. The study of the text can provide clues to see the efforts of various groups in a particular historical period in constructing what is referred to as selected meaning, as well as to examine what ideas work behind them, as well as the theoretical preferences they use.

This method will be implicitly used as a general guideline to map the discourse of populism, explain the factors of globalization and market economics as well as the dysfunction of liberal democracy that raises vulnerability and marginalization, what factors link some social scientists to call it the demand and supply side between populism and identity politics? As well as projecting the impact of populism and identity politics on democratization. The narrative of identity in the analysis of this paper becomes the material to analyze how the tendency to strengthen populism as an identity politics needs to be responded to in anticipation of widespread social vulnerability, especially in the face of the next election event.

Results and Discussions

The Crystallization of Identity Politics

The rapid globalization and market economy caused the concentration of capital to accumulate in certain sectors, especially extractive industries, real estate/finance, and high technology, thus accelerating capital accumulation. These developments lead to and encourage uneven development (uneven development) (Sombatpoonsiri, 2018). On the other hand, the economy of the extractive sector and the development of real estate make ownership of assets (also

property) decline or even make citizens lose production land. The economic contraction due to mismanagement of the financial sector and property insurance as happened in the United States in 2008 also made residents lose their homes (Gest, 2016).

Economic growth in the market system maintains the dominance of the economic elite which is the crony capitalist of the previous regime. By relying on capital ownership and assets obtained from privileges (such as monopolies or concessions) granted by previous rulers, the old economic elite (oligarchy) continued to dominate the economy (Chua, 2008; Eyal, Szelényi, Szelenyi, & Townsley, 1998; Robison & Hadiz, 2004). This was compounded by a shift in the concentration of capital in the "new economy" sector and a slowing economy in the year the last years that have increasingly widened economic inequality.

Other changes occur in the labor market under the influence of the regulation of extra-national institutions (global and regional) and multi-national company decisions accompanied by the use of new technology by insecurity in some segments of the working class (Edwards, 2001). Regime Flexible employment in the form of part-time contract workers, outsourcing, and individual work contracts creates job insecurity and increases the precariat class (Hadiz, 2012; Nugroho & Tjandraningsih, 2012). This condition impacts on the erosion of trade union membership, so that the influence and bargaining power of trade unions, which originally became the foundation for ensuring that the interests and rights of the working class are met, declining.

On the other hand, globalization and the market economy regime dictate citizens become market citizenship (market citizenship); interactions, exchanges, and ownership related to assets, goods, and services are determined based on purchasing power and capital transactions (commodification) (Rodan & Jayasuriya, 2009). The accumulation of capital accumulation in a handful of entrepreneurs, flexible labor regimes, and market citizenship in the framework of globalization and the market economy has an impact on increasing the income gap and lead to the sharpening of poverty (Robison, 2006).

Vulnerability and uncertainty as a result of globalization and the market economy are exacerbated by the reduction in social welfare programs (welfare programs) in the form of social protection or safety nets and social security for certain groups of people causing citizens in the vulnerable categories to be economically and socially marginalized (Gest, 2016). The decline in programs social welfare as a consequence of the reduced role of the state due to "being taken over" by the market or due to shrinking the country's financial capacity due to economic crises (such as in Greece and Spain) or as a result

of the allocation of social security to certain community groups, such as immigrants or refugees (as in the UK), adding pressure to the individual (Gest, 2016).

The influence of changes in economic structure and the dominance of market regimes influence the formation of citizens' identities. Jane Wheelock and Michael Hill, for example, describe the link between uncertainty and marginalized situations by elaborating on three interconnected conditions (Vail, Wheelock, & Hill, 1999). First, if security is a condition of guaranteeing prosperity or safety, insecurity is a concern for circumstances in uncertainty. Thus, uncertainty is always associated with disconnection; conditions when individuals are not integrated into social relations due to the economic marginalization they experience.

Second, security is a guarantee and confidence in which a person can "set aside" a portion of the work for his or her family's welfare. Doubt is a feeling of hopelessness and low self-confidence in the guarantee of prosperity in the future. It shows the powerlessness and inability to realize welfare or protect the needs of a person or his family. Third, security is a condition of stability, where someone has hope because of the certainty of the continuity of work so that they can play a role in their social environment. Doubt is an uncertain feeling about the future, work, and social position. These three conditions are formed because a person's relationship in the economic system does not guarantee his welfare. Such groups have the risk of certain events that are unpredictable and without social protection (Gest, 2016; Müller, 2016).

Rosalind Edwards and Judith Glover outline the root of uncertainty, namely the lack of resources, especially economics, which means that every part of one's social life is compromised by these limitations (Edwards, 2001). The inability of individuals to participate in economic processes and social relations due to limited resources can be used to form (new) ideas about identity. In other words, ambiguity in daily life forges a person in identifying himself as resistance to the socio-economic conditions that marginalize him.

This article looks at the extent to which citizens who are marginalized by the market regime are then joined, consciously or not, on certain "identity" projects. This analytical framework approach follows the formula used by Castells in analyzing identity as a product of social relations, not individual attributes (Castells, 2010). The approach emphasizes that social identity is the meaning formed by external situations (groups or individuals).

According to Castells, the construction of social identity goes through three stages. First, legitimate identity. A group rationalizes the identity that wants to be internalized to group members through the nodes of actors in the community group. In this position, social identity emerges with a new meaning of

identity. Secondly, resistance identity. This happens when the value transformation process has been completed. Members of the group make efforts to oppose formal institutions or the ruling elite. Individuals negotiating by presenting themselves aim that the identity attached to him can be accepted by other groups or institutions. Third, project identity. This happens when social actors try to redefine a new identity in society and try to transform the existing social structure. The process is the reshaping of the meaning of identity in front of political institutions and markets.

The marginalization experienced as a result of globalization and the market economy and the weaknesses of liberal democracy encourages people to find their solutions to the problems faced because the government seems unable to provide a solution (Edwards, 2001). The search for answers is then collectively built or defined into new identities that lead to efforts to transform the existing socio-economic structure (Edwards, 2001). The "identity project" as a collective symbol of the resistance met with the "appeal" of the populist leader.

Political Complaints of Identity and Populism

Observing the development of populism in Southeast Asia, Mizuno and Phongpaichit show that populism has increased because the Southeast Asian oligarchic political regime does not carry out the role of the state as citizens expect in fulfilling their citizenship rights as providers of social welfare and redistribution of resources to minimize inequality (Mizuno & Phongpaichit, 2009).

Meanwhile, according to Inglehart and Norris, two factors are causing the emergence of populism (Inglehart & Norris, 2017). First, the widening economic gap in developed economies (Britain and the United States are contemporary examples) and developing economies (Gest, 2016; Inglehart & Norris, 2017). The sharpening of the economic inequality gap is a result from a shift in capital investment from the manufacturing and agro-industry sectors to services, information and technology, and the creative industries. Such a shift has made most of the sectors that have absorbed a lot of labor in the United States and the United Kingdom is known as white working-class lost their jobs (Gest, 2016).


Second, the emergence of extreme or radical political ideologies outside the spectrum of more established ideologies. This extreme ideology developed into a kind of refutation or negated the mainstream view which was considered unable to provide a solution to the turbulence of social and economic situations. The emergence of the idea of nationalism or communitarianism or extreme sectarianism took sympathy and seemed to fight for the despair of social groups that were marginalized due to economic and social changes.

Starting from the review of Mudde and Karwassser, Inglehart and Norris, as well as Gest (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). this paper offers an analytical framework for identifying factors that contribute to the rise of populism and its compounds with identity politics. The first factor, economic development, and globalization brings uneven and exploitative economic development create uncertainty and inequality for most of the population (Harvey, 2013). The market economy introduces "Flexible Labor Regimes" (outsourced and/or informal labor) and the commodification of daily life where most people feel marginalized and confused. These conditions then led them to consider themselves a "new minority" (Gest, 2016) and a "major rejection" of the status quo began (Marcuse, 1964).

Economic uncertainty or vulnerability is understood as an individual's interaction with a market economy that provides sufficient (or insufficient) material resources to provide a basis for personal security. The economic vulnerability involves financial security, job security, protection of ownership or land use rights, and investment in education (including skills). Social security is generally seen as minimal protection (social safety nets) "offered" by the state to people whose personal security is threatened by sudden and drastic changes in their lives.

The next factor concerns the weaknesses of liberal democracy in several aspects. First, liberal and pluralist systems do not guarantee the political representation of extreme or middle-class groups. The tendency that occurs in some new democracies is that the previous regime could maintain dominance in political institutions (Eyal et al., 1998; Robison & Hadiz, 2004). Secondly, bad governance causes the government to be unable to provide social security or provide public services. Inevitably, reduced or limited public services for basic rights, such as education, health, housing and/or basic infrastructure can lead to negative perceptions of the ability of the government.

Figure 1. Populism, Identity Politics, and Democracy at a Crossroads



These two factors make the majority of the population feel treated unfairly or discriminatively by the ruling elite. Economic insecurity or social unrest will thicken the collective identity based on primordial ties. Majority groups who feel sidelined and ignored by mainstream political institutions and actors produce a new collective identity that supports the ideas of populist leaders.

Could Populism and Democracy Side By Side?

Populism, of course, shifts the relationship of political representation into identity politics and how power is exercised. The populist regime shows a simple message: populist leaders based on their appeal to the frustrations and aspirations of groups excluded from the political arena and the economic process (Mizuno & Phongpaichit, 2009). William Case argues that the fate of democracy is largely determined by the opportunity that contextual factors can provide populist mobilization (Case, 2017). If the opportunity for populist mobilization is open, populism will dominate the political sphere. The disappearance of populism and identity politics in Indonesia, for example, the appearance of "political Islam" during the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, was a victory of this group's failure in electoral politics and also as an influential opposition since the New Order era (Hadiz, 2016). The achievement is seen from the alliance that was built across groups ranging from the urban poor, the middle-class urban prefectorial, petty bourgeoisie and conglomerates (Hadiz, 2016).

According to James Manor, progressive actors can benefit from the rise of populism in post-clientelism conditions. During a period of political liberalization, elites competed with one another to win electoral contestation. They offer populist programs and approach urban poor groups, trade unions, peasants and the like. That happens because several clientelistic instruments, such as the buying and selling of votes, pork-barrels, and patronage that were previously "reliable", cannot currently mobilize political support effectively (Mizuno & Phongpaichit, 2009). The need for broader voter support sometimes encourages elites to negotiate with the people and offering programs according to broader interests (Mizuno & Phongpaichit, 2009).

Democratic transformative opportunities will open up if there is a discourse to change the political and economic structure. The transformative change also needs to pay attention to several prerequisites to prevent the crystallization of identity politics. The opening of several progressive political spaces from below requires synergy between trade unions, sectoral groups, civil society organizations as a form of alliance / joint front. Transformative policy campaigns to strengthen civic

organizations and the public interest through broader alliances promote reforms related to welfare, decent work, and employment relations, as well as effective and non-corrupt.

The second aspect is the formulation of transformative change platforms and strategic policies to attract broader public support. Advocating the theme of social welfare and inclusive development and improving governance related to political representation and access to resources can be an agenda that has the potential to gain broad support. From the previous elaboration on the conditions of citizens' marginalization due to globalization and expansion of the market economy, the agenda offer then the transformative change agenda offer will be able to answer uncertainty so that it will, in turn, get public support.

The future of democracy in the era of the proliferation of populism holds big questions about how it can survive. The experiences of Thailand, the United States, and the United Kingdom, for example, show the decline of substantial democracy. Our task now is to find and find alternative narratives that can offer ideas and solutions to globalization and the market economy and present a representative and responsive government.

The Mobilization of Identity Politics As a Shortcut

The emergence of right-populism politics is also possible because of the dislocation of representative democracy which makes political choices provided through electoral mechanisms very limited, or even non-existent. In Western European countries, this condition is also a product of the post-political situation. In the Indonesian context, the political crisis based on contemporary representation is at least rooted in "depoliticization", including the "floating mass" policy, in the discourse of New Order developmentalism carried out simultaneously with the removal of progressive political projects from the leftist traditions of the Cold War era. The practice of depoliticization not only resulted in apolitical societies and scattered civil movements but also representative institutions such as political parties lost their ability to organize their respective political bases. On the other hand, the dominance of Chinese domestic capitalist business class which has limited entry into the political arena due to anti-Chinese narratives that are constantly being reproduced makes political parties that do not have a strong capitalist class dependent on Chinese businessmen to form predatory alliances in electoral competition. This situation marked the occurrence of a representation crisis in Indonesia, which has been continuously reproduced until now.

Since the 1980s, and increasingly massive at the end of the Soeharto period when the discourse of democracy and internal friction of the regime strengthened, disappointment and opposition to the New Order articulated with various ideologies

and demands began to spread (Aspinall, 2005; Budiman, 2001). However, the fragmentation of pro-democracy opposition and over-efforts the focus of the movement was to overthrow Suharto, making them fail or did not have time to build a joint political agenda post-Suharto. Besides, there was a reorganization of the previous oligarchic power constellation in a new democratic political setting (Hadiz & Robison, 2006), among others by reproducing anti-communism narratives to perpetuate the impossibility of the birth of progressive politics. In this context, predatory alliances consisting of politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen remain the main elements that drive the workings of state institutions including in carrying out the process of democratization. The old elite who were in the New Order's power circle also dominated democratic institutions, while the Chinese domestic bourgeoisie which controlled capital became more established in developing business (Chua, 2008), so that it had a more dominant position in controlling power than in the previous era. As a result, democratic political mechanisms are carried out not to build the common good (common good), but just a new arena of power struggles and the accumulation of wealth for the benefit of the predatory elite.

Democratization and decentralization have indeed opened up new arenas for more diverse political articulations, including paving the way for the birth of new political parties. However, because the crisis of representation is constantly being reproduced as part of an oligarchic reorganization of power relations, society remains apolitical while progressive civil movements are not organized. The result remains: there is no strong social basis for the birth of new political parties, especially one that can offer a progressive political agenda. The difference is that the political elite and businessmen have become fragmented and competing with one another.

In conditions of such a crisis of representation, the path taken to garner votes in electoral contestation is not based on a long-term political agenda by building a strong social base, but through money politics, violent politics and thuggery (Hadiz, 2010; Mudhoffir, 2017), as well as the politicization of religious and regional sentiments narrow one. This can explain how exclusionary identity politicization has become a shortcut in electoral pressure. People can even tolerate poverty and corruption, for example, but insist on identity-based political issues. In the end, political battles are colored more by sectarian issues than efforts to build a democratic order and shared prosperity. The implication is that the struggle for power and resources is built through the politicization of narrow communitarian morals ("infidels", "non-natives", and the like) inequality aimed at building a common good through democratic political mechanisms.

Conclusion

There are various practices of populism that have emerged in response to globalization and the practice of liberal democracy. Populism in Indonesia has experienced a tendency to strengthen since the 2014 presidential election along with the presence of a candidate figure who carries two different ideas of populism, namely classical populism, and technocratic populism. In a political context, populism as an identity politics appears by narrating identity as a symbol of resistance from the majority group who feel marginalized due to oligarchic power management. Nativism also appears in the narrative of populist identity to emphasize the disaggregation of positions facing the opposing groups.

Populism carries the idea of 'alignment' with the people, which is the essence of democracy. However, this partisanship is not enough because the identity narrative in populism can also be constructed for the sake of the legitimacy of oligarchic power. The populism that emerges now is the fruit of the politicization of certain elite factions that have been marginalized informal political struggles. The strengthening of populist politics opens up the possibility of resisting the domination of elite politics that are structurally benefited by the formal patterns of liberal democracy. Therefore, what is needed is to target structural inequalities criticized in populism regarding the democratic system. The vulnerabilities faced by the majority group must be overcome by creating a cross-class social welfare agenda. Here, inclusiveness is translated not as a compromise with political elites, but as an extension of alignments to groups that benefit from managing public affairs.

References

- Aspinall, E. (2005). *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bourchier, D. (2015). *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family State*. London: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3132847.3132886>
- Budiman, A. (2001). *Aktor Demokrasi: Catatan tentang Gerakan Perlawanan di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi.
- Case, W. (2017). *Populist Threats and Democracy's Fate in Southeast Asia: Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia*. London: Routledge.
- Castells, M. (2010). *The Power of Identity: The Information Age; Economy, Society, and Culture*. England: Willey-Blackwell Company.
- Chua, C. (2008). *Chinese Big Business in Indonesia: The State of Capital*. London: Routledge.
- Edwards, R. (2001). *Risk and Citizenship: Key Issues in Welfare*.

- London dan New York: Routledge.
- Eyal, G., Szelenyi, I., Szelenyi, I., & Townsley, E. R. (1998). *Making Capitalism Without Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-communist Central Europe*. London: Verso.
- Gest, J. (2016). *The New Minority: White Working Class Politics in an Age of Immigration and Inequality*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Habibi, M. (2017). Analisis Politik Identitas di Indonesia. Working Paper, 1-22. <https://doi.org/10.31227/osf.io/pey72>
- Hadiz, V. R. (2010). *Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia A Southeast Asia Perspective*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Hadiz, V. R. (2012). Politik Gerakan Buruh di Asia Tenggara. In S. Arifin, F. Panimbang, A. Mufakkir, & Fauzan (Eds.), *Memetakan Gerakan Buruh* (p. 6). Depok: Penerbit Kepik.
- Hadiz, V. R. (2016). *Islamic Populism in Indonesia and the Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hadiz, V. R., & Robison, R. (2006). *The Political Economy of Oligarchy and the Reorganization of Power in Indonesia*. London dan New York: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Harvey, D. (2013). *Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution*. London: Verso.
- Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2017). Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash. SSRN Electronic Journal. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2818659>
- Jayasuriya, K., & Rodan, G. (2007). Beyond Hybrid Regimes: More Participation, Less Contestation in Southeast Asia. *Democratization*, 14(5), 773–794. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340701635647>
- Kahn, J. S. (2001). *Modernity and Exclusion*. London: SAGE Publications, Inc.
- Laclau, E. (2005). *On Populist Reason*. London: Verso. Retrieved from <http://voidnetwork.gr/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/On-Populist-Reason-by-Ernesto-Laclau.pdf>
- Manor, J. (2013). Post-clientelist Initiatives. In K. Stokke & O. Tornquist (Eds.), *Democratization in the Global South: The Importance of Transformative Politics* (pp. 243–253). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Marcuse, H. (1964). *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Mizuno, K., & Phongpaichit, P. (2009). *Populism in Asia*. Singapore: NUS Press and Kyoto University Press.
- Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492037>
- Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2012). *Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2017). *Populism: Very Short Introductions*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mudhoffir, A. M. (2017). Islamic Militias and Capitalist Development in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 47(4), 495–514. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2017.1336564>
- Müller, J.-W. (2016). *What Is Populism?* Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Nugroho, H., & Tjandraningsih, I. (2012). Rezim Fleksibilitas Pasar Kerja dan Tanggung Jawab Negara. In S. Arifin, F. Panimbang, A. Mufakkir, & Fauzan (Eds.), *Memetakan Gerakan Buruh* (p. 110). Depok: Penerbit Kepik.
- Robison, R. (2006). *The Neoliberal Revolution: Forging the Market State*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.
- Robison, R., & Hadiz, V. R. (2004). *Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets*. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Rodan, G., & Jayasuriya, K. (2009). Capitalist Development, Regime Transitions and New Forms of Authoritarianism in Asia. *Pacific Review*, 22(1), 23–47. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512740802651003>
- Sombatpoonsiri, J. (2018). Rethinking Civil Resistance in the Face of Rightwing Populism: A Theoretical Inquiry. *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, 13(3), 7–22. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2018.1496028>
- Sosale, S. (2007). *Communication, Development and Democracy: Mapping a Discourse*. New York: Hampton Press.
- Vail, J., Wheelock, J., & Hill, M. (1999). *Insecure Times: Living with Insecurity in Modern Society*. London dan New York: Routledge.
- Winters, J. A. (2013). Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia. *Indonesia*, 96(1), 11–33. <https://doi.org/10.1353/ind.2013.0017>